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In response to widespread perceptions of problems 
associated with congressional earmarks, reform eff orts 
began in late 2006 and continued through 2010. 
Th is essay summarizes those problems, explains the 
distribution of earmarks within Congress, and documents 
their rise and relative fall between 1991 and 2010 using 
government and public interest group databases. Th e 
author explains and critiques earmark reform policies, 
including congressional rules, initiatives taken by the 
congressional appropriations committees, and reforms 
pursued by the George W. Bush and Barack Obama 
administrations. Congressional rules and committee-
initiated reforms have been most eff ective, resulting in 
signifi cant improvements in earmark transparency and 
accountability. Th e number and dollar value of earmarks 
fi rst dropped noticeably in fi scal year 2007 after an 
earmark moratorium, and then stabilized as reforms 
were implemented. It is premature to conclude that these 
levels will continue or that reforms will alter the policy 
content of earmarks or their distribution among members 
of Congress.
Earmarking, Savage argued, “is an important political and budgetary issue” (2009, 448). Its signifi cance, however, lies in the perspective 
taken on it. For example, in a comprehensive critique 
of the contemporary budget process, Rubin noted that 
earmarks have grown “beyond the ability of legisla-
tors to evaluate and prioritize,” and that some of them 
“have been revealed as rewards for fi nancial donors, 
contributing to the impression that government is 
corrupt” (2007, 608). Th ey are no longer, she argued, 
part of “the hurly-burly of competitive budgeting” 
(614). Brookings scholars saw the same problem in 
that same year, observing that earmarking had gotten 
“out of hand and was used and abused in a fashion we 
have not seen before in recent years” (Mann, Binder, 
and Ornstein 2007). CQ Weekly observed that “ear-
marks . . . have been cited as a symbol of everything 
that’s wrong with Congress” (Benkelman 2007).
As earmarks became associated with a series of high-
profi le scandals and investigations involving members 
of Congress, lobbyists, and others, public interest 
organizations such as Citizens Against Government 
Waste (CAGW) and Taxpayers for Common Sense 
(TCS) focused extraordinarily critical attention on 
them. Th e mainstream media were similarly critical. 
In a single week in 2008, three television network 
news broadcasts mentioned earmarks 91 times, nearly 
as often as they made reference to Afghanistan (Alter-
man and Zornick 2008).
Within Congress, a handful of senators and congress-
men consistently attacked earmarks as spending bills 
moved through Congress. Congressman Jeff  Flake 
referred to earmarks as “the currency of corruption 
in Congress” (2006), “no-bid contracts” (2009), 
and a “gateway drug to out-of-control spending” 
(USA Today 2009). Senator John McCain regularly 
attempted to strike earmarks from appropriations leg-
islation. Earmarking became something of a campaign 
issue during the congressional elections in 2006 and 
2008, and Senator McCain employed his opposition 
to earmarks in 2009 “to rally conservatives reluctant 
to support his presidential campaign” (Kane 2009).
Th e sound and fury associated with earmarks signify 
potential problems of several types, outlined here, 
none of them a threat to constitutional or fi scal order. 
Th ose diffi  culties have become less acute as a con-
sequence of reforms put in place between 2006 and 
2010.
The Earmark Critique
Several themes dominate the earmark critique. First is 
the notion that earmarks serve only the members of 
Congress who procure them rather than some larger 
public purpose. Th e argument is that some members 
of Congress use earmarks to steer funds to companies 
that, in return, provide or arrange for the provision 
of campaign contributions. Th is “busy intersection 
between political fund-raising and taxpayer spending” 
has been at the heart of a series of events associated 
with a lobbying fi rm called the PMA Group (Kirk-
patrick 2006). Th e late congressman John Murtha, 
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sponsored only by a single member of Congress were, with one 
exception, all members of the Defense Appropriations Subcommit-
tees of the SAC or the HAC. Th e exception was majority whip James 
Clyburn (TCS 2009). For FY 2010, TCS found that almost half of 
all earmarks were within the defense appropriations bill. While mem-
bers of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee made up 
only 4 percent of the House, those subcommittee members obtained 
13 percent of all earmarks; the 18 senators on this Senate subcom-
mittee were responsible for 35 percent of all earmarks (TCS 2010b).
A fourth theme assigns earmarks a major role in the growth of 
federal spending and, by implication, the defi cit. Senator George 
LeMieux argued that earmarks “are the engine that drives the train 
that gets us into these huge spending problems” (Friel 2010). Sena-
tor Jim DeMint (2010) asserted that earmarks “are at the heart of 
the spending addiction in Congress.” According to the Wall Street 
Journal (2007), “Nothing highlighted Congress’s spending problem 
in last year’s [2006] election more than earmarks.” Earmarks were, 
indeed, at fl ood tide when the Journal statement was made.
Th e relationship of earmarks to total spending is a function of the 
time frame chosen for measurement (addressed in some detail later). 
Here it is suffi  cient to note that if we look at the change in spend-
ing between FY 2006, just before reforms were implemented, and 
FY 2009, after the reforms began, we discover that spending for 
earmarks dropped 52 percent (using Congressional Research Service 
data) or 32 percent (CAGW data), while discretionary and total 
spending increased by 49.7 percent and 46.7 percent, respectively 
(OMB 2010). Total spending for earmarks in FY 2010 is compared 
to total federal spending and discretionary spending in fi gure 1.
Spending obviously is implicated in the defi cit problem, but 
earmark spending is, in relative terms, quite small, and as a share 
of total spending, getting smaller. One review of total spending 
and earmarks over the past 18 years found a negative correlation 
of –0.09 between earmarks and the size of the defi cit (Crespin 
2009, 4). If there is a fi scal issue here, it arises from the fact that 
prior to reform, earmark spending grew more rapidly than dis-
cretionary spending. Th is implies, at fi rst glance, that discretion 
was being minimized. It is more accurate to say that it was being 
displaced—from agencies to Congress, or to those within Congress 
who control earmarks. It reminds us why this portion of spending is 
called “discretionary.”
former chairman of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee of 
the House Appropriations Committee (HAC), was the subject of 
a House Ethics Committee investigation for practices of this kind 
involving the PMA Group, and Congressman Pete Visclosky, a 
member of the same subcommittee, is being investigated by a grand 
jury and the Offi  ce of Congressional Ethics because of similar activi-
ties (Bresnahan 2009; McCarthy 2010). Th e PMA Group, which 
had been run by a former aide to Congressman Murtha, closed in 
2009 following Federal Bureau of Investigation raids of its offi  ces in 
2008 (Kirkpatrick 2006).
A second theme links earmarks to the suboptimal use of taxpayer 
dollars. It is assumed, Lazarus asserted, “that the earmarking proc-
ess is fundamentally fl awed . . . that earmarks are distributed on a 
purely political basis” (2008, 1). Earmarks are criticized as wasteful, 
or less than effi  cient, in that the funding is not subject to the kind 
of competition or analysis thought to underlie the spending propos-
als that presidents send to Congress. For example, Peter Orszag, 
director of the Offi  ce of Management and Budget (OMB), noted 
that “the issue with many of the programs that we are proposing to 
eliminate that are heavily earmarked is when they are not based on 
sound science or a rigorous approach. And so it’s not necessarily the 
earmarks per se, but rather the outcomes that then come from the 
lack of a consistent approach to evaluating projects, for example, 
that cause the issue” (White House 2009b).
A related criticism is the observation that earmarks are not distrib-
uted “fairly” within Congress. A report from the HAC noted that 
“earmarks cause federal money to be distributed in a manner that 
is geographically unfair and unrefl ective of public needs” (n.d., 14). 
Reviewing more than 13,000 earmarks from the fi rst session of the 
110th Congress, Engstrom and Vanberg (2007) found a strong 
partisan bias aff ecting earmarks (majority party members do better 
than minority party members), and within parties, “the distribution 
of earmarks favors electorally vulnerable members and those holding 
agenda-setting positions.”
TCS and CQ Weekly documented the distribution of earmarks in 
the appropriations bills passed by the House in 2007 and noted 
a similar but more diff erentiated pattern repeated in subsequent 
appropriations bills. Th e lion’s share of earmarks went to three 
groups within Congress: members of the HAC and the Senate 
Appropriations Committee (SAC), members of the party leader-
ship, and incumbents whose chances for reelection were in doubt. 
Members of the HAC received 45 percent of all earmarks in these 
bills, averaging almost $29 million per member; HAC subcommit-
tee chairman John Murtha received $180 million. Th at compares 
with the average member of the House, who received $9.5 million 
in earmarks. Party leaders averaged $14.1 million, and members 
from competitive districts garnered $8.8 million (Allen 2007).
Th e dominance of appropriators was again apparent in the fi scal year 
(FY) 2010 spending bills, as 6 of the top 10 earmark recipients in 
the Senate were on the SAC and 9 of the top 10 in the House were 
on the HAC (the tenth was the Speaker). Th e advantage of appro-
priators over all other members of Congress in winning earmarks 
subsumes yet another pattern—that of members of the Defense Sub-
committees of the HAC and SAC. In the FY 2009 appropriations 













Figure 1 Total, Discretionary and Earmark Spending, FY 2010 
(Budget Authority in Trillions)
Sources: OMB Historical Tables, Taxpayers for Common Sense (http://www.
taxpayer.net/index.php).
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result combined elements of conventional 
earmark defi nitions with the implication that 
earmarking results in a suboptimal allocation 
of funds. Th at defi nition is based on Executive 
Order 13457, “Protecting American Taxpay-
ers from Government Spending on Wasteful 
Earmarks,” issued by the Bush administra-
tion following the 2008 State of the Union 
address, which included another admonition 
to Congress to curtail earmarks.
Th e variation in defi ning earmarks signals complexity and cautions 
against certainty in measuring changes in earmark outcomes and 
detailing policy developments. While it impedes some analyses, 
particularly when detailed discussions are involved, it does not 
obstruct an examination of the major developments in earmarking 
and earmark reform.
The Rise of Earmarks
Earmarks in the federal budget grew steadily and dramatically 
between the early 1990s and 2007, after which they dropped 
noticeably, and may have stabilized at roughly 2002 levels. Four 
databases—two governmental and two from public interest organi-
zations—covering four diff erent segments of the period between 
1991 and 2010 are used here to demonstrate the nature and extent 
of earmark expansion and retreat. Trends in earmark spending as 
calculated by these four sources are displayed in fi gure 2.
Defi nitional Diffi culties
Th ere is agreement on the notion that there is 
no agreement on the defi nition of an earmark, 
offi  cially and unoffi  cially, that is, inside and 
outside of government. Th e defi nitions used 
by watchdog groups such as CAGW and TCS 
diff er from those used by government organi-
zations such as the Congressional Research 
Service (CRS), OMB, HAC and SAC, and 
the House and Senate rules committees. Even the approaches taken 
by diff erent subcommittees of the HAC and SAC diff er when it 
comes to identifying earmarks (CRS 2008). Further complicating 
matters, an anodyne alternative for the term “earmark” emerged in 
2007. Originating in the Senate, the term “congressional directed 
spending item” appeared as a substitute for earmark, and has been 
used subsequently by both Congress and the OMB.
Th e OMB confronted the defi nitional problem directly in 2007 
when it established its earmarks database (http://www.earmarks.
omb.gov). Th e database was the predicate of the George W. Bush 
administration’s earmark limitation initiative outlined in the presi-
dent’s 2007 State of the Union address, in which he urged the 110th 
Congress to end the practice of putting earmarks in committee 
reports. Th e OMB issued several memoranda to agencies over the 
following months, articulating an evolving series of earmark defi ni-
tions and simultaneously discouraging agencies from funding non-
statutory earmarks (i.e., those in reports rather than bills). Th e fi nal 
There is agreement on the 
notion that there is no 
agreement on the definition 
of an earmark, officially and 
unofficially, that is, inside and 
outside of government. 



































Figure 2 Earmark Spending
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available through the Federal Government.” Th e OMB selected FY 
2005 as a baseline for measuring changes in earmark development; 
to date, three additional years of data (FY 2008–10) are available 
on the OMB website. Th e OMB data indicate that the number of 
earmarks dropped by 31.9 percent between FY 2005 and FY 2010, 
and their dollar value dropped by 41.3 percent.
A fourth earmarks database, from Taxpayers for Common Sense, 
also focuses on recent developments, capturing information for FY 
2008 through FY 2010. Th e TCS data indicate that over this brief 
post-reform period, the number of earmarks dropped 26 percent, 
while the cost dropped by 13 percent.
Th us, the earmark expansion that began in the early 1990s abated 
beginning around FY 2006; earmark spending then dropped, stabi-
lizing at about the FY 2002 level. Th is is explained by an earmark 
moratorium and subsequent reforms of the processes aff ecting 
earmarks.
The Scope and Structure of Reform
Pro forma earmark reform began in FY 2006. Real reform was initi-
ated in 2007, fi rst by congressional rules (extended through 2010), 
then by decisions taken by the HAC and SAC over the same period. 
Th e Bush and Barack Obama administrations also attempted to 
infl uence congressional earmarking practices during this period, 
with minimal impact.
Various congressional party organizations also engaged in the ear-
mark reform debate. Th ese eff orts, primarily involving House GOP 
organizations and earmark moratoria, have been similarly ineff ec-
tive to date. Th ey are not addressed here, although they are worth 
noting as indicators of the political salience of this issue and perhaps 
the direction of future reform. Th is is particularly relevant with 
respect to earmark bans, on the agenda again in 2010, though with 
uncertain results.
Eff orts to curb earmarks undertaken by individual members 
of the House and Senate fall into yet another category. Over 
the period covered here, the most notable members advocating 
earmark reform are Senators Tom Coburn, Jim DeMint, Russ 
Feingold, and John McCain and Representatives Jeff  Flake, Jeb 
Hensarling, and Paul Ryan. Th ese “saints” fi gured prominently in 
eff orts such as the attempt to impose a moratorium on earmarks 
or, in a welter of cases involving individual bills, to remove all 
earmarks.2 Th ese endeavors are also omitted because they are 
less concerned with the reform of earmark policy than with the 
abolition of earmarks, either temporarily (the moratoria) or 
permanently. As such, they have had marginal impact on earmark 
policy.3
Reform by Rule
Each new Congress adopts rules to govern the operation of com-
mittees and the manner in which legislation will be considered on 
the fl oor. Such rules include points of order for enforcement and 
remain in eff ect for the two-year tenure of the Congress that adopts 
them. Th e House adopted formal changes to its offi  cial rules late in 
2006, ostensibly providing some of the transparency demanded by 
earmarks critics. Th is was the precursor to more substantive rules 
addressing earmarks adopted in 2007.
Th e Citizens Against Government Waste database is the most com-
prehensive and has the broadest defi nition of earmarks. CAGW 
uses the term “pork” interchangeably with “earmarks,” and has an 
expansive defi nition of pork (CAGW 2009). CAGW data cover 
20 years and paint a distinct and somewhat dramatic picture. Th e 
number of earmarks grew 1,572 percent from 1991 to 2010, while 
spending for earmarks over this period increased 432 percent. By 
comparison, discretionary spending—the locus of the appropria-
tions bills in the CAGW database—grew 128 percent over this 
period, a fraction of the rate of increase in earmark spending 
(OMB 2010). Th is suggests that earmarks expanded vertically—
that is, in terms of numbers and cost—and also horizontally, 
extending their impact on discretionary spending in general. Put 
otherwise, earmarks began to take up more space within discretion-
ary spending. Th is “cramping eff ect” ended when earmark spending 
dropped and then leveled off  toward the end of this decade, while 
discretionary spending continued to grow.
Th e CAGW data indicate an interruption in the pattern of steady 
growth in the cost and number of earmarks, beginning in FY 
2006 and FY 2005, respectively. Th e cost dropped by more than 
54 percent between FY 2006 and FY 2007, and the number of 
earmarks dropped by 29 percent from FY 2005 to FY 2006. In both 
instances, growth subsequently resumed, but the rate of increase has 
diminished (see fi gures 2 and 3).
Th e pattern of earmark expansion in the CAGW data is congru-
ent with the conclusions from CRS earmark data, the second most 
extensive source of information.1 Because of varying defi nitions and 
methodologies, the CRS did not aggregate earmark data for all of 
the bills reviewed. Such diff erences are ignored here in the inter-
est of providing a general sense of the evolution of earmarks. Th e 
CRS results generally indicate a much less dramatic increase than 
the sixfold change found in the CAGW database (which covered a 
slightly longer period of time). Following the drop-off  for FY 2006, 
they reveal the same end to the “cramping eff ect” that earmarks 
previously exerted on discretionary spending seen in the CAGW 
data. Over the past decade, earmark spending has dropped from 3 
percent of discretionary spending to less than half that amount, at 
1.3 percent. Th at trend is displayed in fi gure 3.
A third earmark database—from the OMB—purports to provide 
“more information on earmarks in one place than has ever been 































Sources: Citizens Against Government Spending (http://www.cagw.org), OMB 
Historical Tables.
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earmarks. Th e confl ict centered on the timely publication of ear-
mark information on the House version of the homeland security 
appropriations bill for FY 2008 in June 2007. Th is was the fi rst FY 
2008 appropriations bill to come to the fl oor of the House under 
the new earmark rules. Republicans blocked action on the bill, 
objecting to Congressman David Obey’s plan to delay publishing 
earmark information.
Chairman Obey said that the HAC staff  had been deluged with 
earmark requests (in excess of 30,000), as a result of which more 
time was needed to review them. Consequently, he indicated his 
intention to ignore the new House rule on the timing of the release 
of earmark information and “drop the earmarks into the bills when 
they move to the House-Senate conference committees before the 
August break” (Williamson 2007). Time for scrutiny of the ear-
marks would be available between House passage and the confer-
ence—roughly a month—but this would preclude review before 
House members actually voted on the bill.
Th e resolution of this impasse produced the third congressional rule 
on earmarks. H.R. 491, passed by the House on June 18, 2007, 
addressed transparency issues aff ecting “air-drops.” Air-drops are 
earmarks added to conference agreements that were not in either the 
House or the Senate version of the appropriations bills subject to 
the conference. Th e new House rule provided for public disclosure 
of air-dropped earmarks within conference reports by prohibiting 
consideration of conference reports unless the joint explanatory 
statement accompanying such reports included a list of earmarks 
in the conference report or joint statement, and the names of the 
earmark sponsors. H.R. 491 was a standing order, rather than part 
of the conventional rules package (H.R. 6) adopted at the beginning 
of the 110th Congress. However, like those rules, it was eff ective for 
the remainder of the Congress and was included in the Senate ver-
sion of earmark reform.
Th e fourth rule change aff ecting earmarks was the Senate version of 
the two rule changes that took eff ect in the House. Th e vehicle in 
the Senate was S. 1, an ethics reform bill that included a section on 
earmarks titled the Legislative Transparency and Accountability Act 
of 2007. S. 1 became law on September 14 as the Honest Leader-
ship and Open Government Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-81). Section 
521, titled “Congressionally Directed Spending,” incorporated the 
earmark reforms for the Senate, adding them to the standing rules 
of the Senate as Rule XLIV.
Th e Senate earmark rules were very similar to the House rules, but 
not identical. Rule XLIV made it out of order in the Senate to vote 
on appropriations bills containing earmarks until the chairman of 
the committee of jurisdiction or the majority leader provided a list 
of the names of senators sponsoring the earmarks. Th e information 
had to be “available on a publicly accessible congressional website in 
a searchable format at least 48 hours before such vote” (Rule XLIV, 
1[a][(2]). Senators requesting earmarks were required to provide to 
the committee of jurisdiction their names, the name and location of 
the intended recipient, the purpose of the earmark, and certifi cation 
that neither they nor their immediate family had a fi nancial interest 
in the earmark (Rule XLIV, 6[a]). As with the House rules, points of 
order were used to bring the Senate rules to bear—that is, they were 
not self-enforcing.
Th e GOP, the majority party in the House and Senate in 2006, 
promised “comprehensive earmark reform rules change” (Higa 
2006). H.R. 1000, adopted on September 14 by a vote of 245–171, 
was the result. With this vote, “the House reacted to a year of 
congressional scandals by requiring its members to own up to the 
thousands of earmarks they sponsor each year” (Birnbaum 2006). 
According to this rule, earmarks inserted into appropriations bills in 
committee or in conference would have to be disclosed, along with 
the names of the members of Congress sponsoring them. (Notably, 
of the 24 Republicans who voted against the rule change, 22 were 
members of the HAC.) In this early instance of earmark reform, 
disclosure meant inclusion within the reports that accompany 
appropriations bills.
Th is reform may not have been too little, but it was clearly too late. 
H.R. 1000 was not retroactive, and the House already had passed 
all but one of its appropriations bills for the year by the time these 
rules took eff ect. Th us, the rules would aff ect only this single bill 
and conference reports, and only in the House. In any event, no 
earmarks of any kind were disclosed as a consequence of the 2006 
House rule change (Dennis 2006).
However, a major portion of the earmarks that apparently escaped 
this eleventh-hour reform were blocked in 2007 by a one-time event 
that occurred as political power passed from the GOP to the Demo-
crats in the 110th Congress. Th at event was the fi rst and only ear-
mark moratorium, implemented between the promulgation of this 
fi rst symbolic earmark reform rule and more substantive earmark 
reform rules adopted in early 2007. Th e moratorium, an initiative of 
the HAC and SAC, is treated in the next section.
Th e second rule change aff ecting earmarks—and the fi rst one to 
have an impact—was put in place when the 110th Congress was 
sworn in January 5, 2007. Earmark reforms were incorporated in 
clause 9 of Rule XXI and clauses 16 and 17 of Rule XXIII of the 
House rules package (H.R. 6). House Democrats said that the new 
rules would help bring an end to a “‘culture of corruption’ that 
led to the GOP losing control of Congress after 12 years” (Dennis 
2007).
Earmarks in the rule were defi ned, generally, as provisions that are 
primarily included at the request of a member of Congress and 
that provide specifi c amounts of discretionary budget authority 
for certain purposes “with or to an entity or targeted to a spe-
cifi c State, locality, or Congressional district” (House Rule XXI, 
clause 9, section 4d). Th e House could not consider legislation 
unless a list of earmarks and their sponsors in such legislation or 
the accompanying report was made available in specifi ed public 
documents—that is, committee reports or the Congressional Record 
(in the former for committee-reported bills, in the latter for other 
legislation). Members requesting earmarks were required to provide 
to the chairman and ranking member of the HAC, in writing, the 
name and address of the intended earmark recipient, its purpose, 
and certifi cation that neither the requesting member nor his or her 
spouse had a fi nancial interest in the earmark (House Rule XXIII, 
clause 17).
Implementing the new earmark rule became a severe problem, 
ultimately providing the incentive for a third rule change aff ecting 
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in 2006 by the previous Congress. Th is is the primary explanation 
for the drop in earmark spending between FY 2006 and FY 2007 
seen in fi gure 2. Th is initiative, however important it was in con-
straining earmarks in FY 2007 appropriations bills, was a one-time 
event, and hence of marginal policy consequence. Th e data in fi gure 
2 support this conclusion.
More meaningful committee-initiated reforms began in January 
2009, when the HAC and SAC jointly announced additional trans-
parency requirements. Th e key changes were to require the posting 
of data about earmark requests, as opposed to earmarks that had 
been approved, and to require members to post this information 
on their own websites rather than on committee websites. For FY 
2010, members requesting earmarks in appropriations bills would 
have to post information on these items when the request was made, 
“explaining the purpose of the earmark and why it is a valuable use 
of taxpayer funds” (HAC 2009b).5 Further, 
the committees promised to provide earmark 
disclosure tables to the public on the same day 
that the relevant appropriations subcommit-
tees released their report, or 24 hours before 
full committee consideration of bills that had 
not been marked up a Senate subcommittee.
Requiring members requesting earmarks to 
post their requests on their own congressional 
websites produced a variety of responses. 
In the House, compliance produced “a 
hodgepodge, with some members of each 
party proudly displaying their requests while 
many others apparently did their utmost to 
keep their requests out of public view” (Allen 2009b). Few House 
member websites used the term “earmark” in providing the required 
information. Some member offi  ces admitted off  the record that they 
“relabeled, moved or altered their initial online disclosure links after 
they were criticized or after their offi  ces became concerned that they 
soon would come under scrutiny for how they fi rst posted their 
spending requests” (Allen 2009a). Moreover, the HAC-imposed 
deadline for activating links to earmark requests on member web-
sites was not met by all members, though it is impossible to know 
how many were delinquent and whether their requests were denied 
because they were tardy, as this HAC policy would require (Allen 
2009a).
Th e HAC also provided member earmark request data by subcom-
mittee bill.6 On the HAC website, subcommittees provide links 
for their bill, titled “Earmark Certifi cation Letters,” where copies 
of the letters sent by each House member to the HAC requesting 
earmarks are available for viewing. As in the Senate, the letters from 
representatives refl ect each member’s interpretation of the need to 
rationalize earmark requests, including the need to indicate the 
amount requested.
Th e SAC provided a link to the websites of individual senators titled 
“Congressionally-Directed Spending Requests.” Th ose websites, 
however, are not always clear as to the location of senatorial earmark 
data. Senators exercise discretion in complying with the SAC 
mandate to explain and justify their earmark requests (e.g., some 
senators indicate the amount of their request, while others do not).
Because the Senate rules did not take eff ect until late in the year, 
their applicability to FY 2008 spending bills may be questioned. 
Compliance issues aside, it should be noted that in April, before the 
adoption of S. 1, the SAC announced that it would adopt earmark 
reforms for the FY 2008 spending bills pending passage of the 
Honest Leadership and Open Government Act. Th e new policies 
called for clear identifi cation of earmarks, their sponsor, amount, 
recipient, and purpose. Earmark information would be published 
on the website of the SAC and the Library of Congress.4 Senators 
also would have to certify that they had no fi nancial interest in the 
earmark (SAC 2007).
Th e earmark rule changes put in place in 2007 were in eff ect for 
the 110th Congress (2007–8) and were adopted again by the 111th 
Congress (2009–10) in 2009 in H.R. 5.
Reform by Committee
Th e HAC and SAC have initiated several 
earmark reforms, the most important of 
which have come from the HAC. Committee-
initiated earmark reforms can be seen as 
operationalizing and sometimes complicating 
the reforms eff ected by House and Senate 
rules. Th eir objectives may be more stringent 
than congressional rules, particularly with 
regard to transparency, but they are also more 
problematic. Th ese problems stem from the 
fact that the processes of promulgation and 
enforcement of committee-initiated reforms 
are opaque, and there are diff erences between 
reforms coming from the HAC and the rela-
tively tepid steps taken by the SAC.
Committee-initiated reforms began in earnest as Representative 
Obey and Senator Robert Byrd prepared to assume their new posi-
tions as chairmen of the House and Senate appropriations commit-
tees, respectively, in the newly elected 110th Congress. In December 
2006, the chairmen announced an important committee decision 
aff ecting earmarks. Th at decision would aff ect the joint funding 
resolution (the fi nal continuing resolution for most FY 2007 spend-
ing) left over from the 109th Congress, and ultimately the number 
of earmarks allowed. Th e decision stemmed in part from the cam-
paign statements of the Democrats in Congress, including incoming 
Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, who, had “railed for months 
against wasteful ‘special interest earmarks’ inserted into bills ‘in the 
dark of night’” (Kirkpatrick 2006).
Congressman Obey and Senator Byrd indicated their decision “to 
dispose of the Republican budget leftovers by passing a year-long 
joint resolution,” meaning there would be no new congressional 
earmarks in a bill providing $463.5 billion in new spending. Th e 
measure would constitute “a moratorium on all earmarks until a 
reformed process is put in place” (HAC 2006). When the joint 
funding resolution was fi led in January 2007, Chairman Obey 
explained that most FY 2007 programs would be funded at the FY 
2006 level, adjusted for increased pay costs, but that the resolution 
was “free of earmarks” (HAC 2007). Th e measure became law on 
February 15. Th us, the only new earmarks in spending bills for FY 
2007 were those in the two full-year appropriations bills approved 
Committee-initiated 
earmark reforms can be 
seen as operationalizing and 
sometimes complicating the 
reforms effected by House and 
Senate rules. Their objectives 
may be more stringent than 
congressional rules, particularly 
with regard to transparency, but 
they are also more problematic.
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earmark requests from House members. Th e SAC chose not to fol-
low either of these HAC initiatives.
Th e ban on earmarks to for-profi t entities is likely to cause problems 
for many would-be recipients and for some on K Street who profi t 
by assisting them. Even if it is enforced, the ban would have a barely 
discernable fi scal impact. Th e cost of earmarks to for-profi t entitles 
in FY 2010 was roughly $1.7 billion (Lichtblau 2010). Th e ban 
was implemented “in a surprisingly casual fashion. No rules were 
drafted and issued to the Democratic Caucus, the Appropriations 
Committee or the full House” (Donnelly 2010). Th at is the nature 
of committee-initiated reforms—they are announced by committee 
leaders, and are creatures of the power and proclivities of those indi-
viduals. “Committee intent” must be inferred from the context, and 
the record of enforcement is a matter of conjecture. Th e new House 
earmark policies were taken without involving either the other party 
or the other chamber.
Further complicating matters, on the following day, the House 
Republican Conference “saw” the HAC’s prohibition on earmarks to 
for-profi t entities and “raised it one,” prohibiting its members from 
submitting requests for earmarks of any kind for FY 2011 (CQ Poli-
tics News 2010). An attempt by earmark opponents in the Senate to 
adopt a similar ban in that chamber was easily defeated (Pierce 2010).
Reform from Above: The Bush Administration and 
Earmarks
Presidents uniformly oppose earmarks, but they have very limited 
power to control them. Were earmarks included in bills rather than 
reports, the veto option would be available, though that approach 
likely would prove ineff ective given the trade-
off  between the desirable (most of what is in 
the bill) and the undesirable (earmarks).
Presidents are left to proselytize, or to 
threaten nonimplementation of earmarks 
in reports, as implied by Executive Order 
13457.7 Th is order set out a series of detailed 
duties for agency heads in dealing with 
earmarks, all of which were intended to 
encourage agencies to implement only those 
earmarks included in appropriations bills 
rather than reports. It provides agencies some 
room for maneuver, by, for example, allowing 
them to fund nonstatutory earmarks on the 
basis of administration policy. Had the Bush 
administration applied it with suffi  cient rigor, 
it could have signifi cantly altered the power of the White House 
regarding the disposition of earmarks not included in statutory law.
Unless and until Executive Order 13457 is rescinded, it remains 
in eff ect. It was available to the Bush administration for all of the 
appropriations bills for FY 2009, most of which were passed while 
President Bush was still in offi  ce, but some of which became law 
under President Obama. Given the potential it provides for lever-
age, an administration may use it in bargaining with members of 
Congress regarding earmarks and other matters. However, there is 
scant public evidence that either administration used the authority 
provided by this executive order to infl uence earmark funding.8
In March 2009, House leaders added another constraint on House 
earmarks (HAC 2009c). Earmarks in the House were to be reviewed 
by the executive branch, and those directed to for-profi t entities 
would be awarded through a competition. Speaker Pelosi character-
ized these measures as ensuring “accountability for Congressional 
earmarks at every step of the Process” (HAC 2009c). Th e executive 
branch review, however, only required that agencies involved in 
executing earmarked funds have 20 days “to check that the pro-
posed earmark is eligible for funding and meets goals established in 
law” (HAC 2009c). Th e competition mandate is similarly vague, 
requiring that earmarks “directed to for-profi t entities will undergo a 
competitive bidding process” (HAC 2009c). Notably, the Senate did 
not endorse these reforms.
Although the requirement for competing earmarks targeting 
for-profi t entities was roughly congruent with one of the earmark 
reforms proposed by the Obama administration on the same day, 
the OMB did not promise to meet the 20-day deadline imposed by 
the HAC. Reviewing thousands of such requests within such a tight 
time frame would be diffi  cult. Perhaps refl ecting that diffi  culty, the 
OMB responded to the 20-day executive branch review requirement 
by telling the House that “the appropriate agencies and departments 
will provide answers to factual questions articulated by Chairs of 
relevant House committees of jurisdiction in as timely a manner 
as possible,” but these responses “should not be construed as an 
evaluation or recommendation of specifi c requests based on merit or 
value” (OMB 2009a).
Because the SAC did not adopt the March 2009 requirements, the 
for-profi t earmark issue arose when the Senate took up its FY 2010 
appropriations bills. Th e resolution found 
in the FY 2010 defense appropriations bill 
suggests the diffi  culty that agencies faced in 
implementing the requirement to compete 
for-profi t earmarks, as well as the fragmenta-
tion of earmark reform policy originating 
with committees. Th e HAC and SAC agreed 
that earmarks to for-profi t entities originat-
ing in House appropriations bills would be 
held to the HAC competition standard, but 
those originating in the Senate would not. Th e 
roughly 5 percent of earmarks that have both 
House and Senate sponsors would be exempt 
from the House competition requirement the 
fi rst year, but would fall under that require-
ment in subsequent years (Clarke 2009). 
Th us, committees and Congress fractured 
policy to resolve their problems, but created new ones for the execu-
tive branch.
As Congress prepared for work on FY 2011 appropriations bills, 
the chairman of the HAC reminded House members of the reforms 
of 2007 and 2009, indicated that these rules would be retained for 
FY 2011 appropriations bills, and announced a goal of holding ear-
marks to less than 1 percent of discretionary spending (HAC 2010). 
He added two new conditions for FY 2011 appropriations. In place 
of the mandate for competing earmarks to for-profi t entities, an 
outright prohibition on such earmarks was to be implemented. Th e 
chairman also promised to establish an online “one-stop” link to all 
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earmarks, but they have very 
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spending for earmarks has stabilized at about $20 billion, approxi-
mately where it was in 2002. Th is means that the real dollar value 
of earmarks has dropped since FY 2006. Similarly, the cramping 
eff ect that earmarks were exerting on discretionary spending has 
diminished, as discretionary spending has continued to grow, both 
absolutely and relative to infl ation. Similarly, as total spending accel-
erated to stimulate the economy and to provide benefi ts for those 
disadvantaged by the recession of 2008–9, the portion attributable 
to earmarks became even more marginal to our fi scal tribulations. 
While it may be premature to stipulate pre- and postreform eras for 
earmarks, fi gure 4 uses average annual rates of growth in the relevant 
variables to contrast these two periods.
Transparency and accountability of earmarks have increased demon-
strably as a consequence of the reforms put in place by congressional 
rules and committee actions between 2006 and 2010. Th e public, 
students of Congress, the media, and, of course, members of Con-
gress themselves can now “see” earmarks as they move through the 
appropriations process, including even earmarks for intelligence pro-
grams funded within the defense appropriations bill (Tiron 2007). 
Public interest databases (CAGW, TCS) have brought a further 
dimension of transparency to the earmark process. On the web-
site of the Center for Responsive Politics, detailed information on 
campaign contributions from earmark recipients for each member 
of Congress is available with just a few clicks (Center for Responsive 
Politics 2010). As a result—and to return to Rubin’s criticism—ear-
marks are now a very visible part of the hurly-burly of competitive 
budgeting. One could argue that given the large amount of infor-
mation now available on this topic and the small amount of spend-
ing now involved, there is more “hurly” involved in earmarks than is 
justifi ed by their “burly.”
Reform by congressional rulemaking allows for enforcement 
through points of order. No attempt was 
made here to determine the extent to 
which these mechanisms actually were used 
to enforce the new rules for earmarking. 
Earmark reform by committee has been 
dominated by the HAC, followed, in part 
and infrequently, by the SAC. Committee-
initiated reforms have bolstered the use of 
the Internet to provide transparency, and also 
have expanded and expedited the availability 
of information on earmarks. Assessment of 
Reform From Above: The Obama Administration and 
Earmarks
Th e Obama administration has taken a moderate position regard-
ing earmark reform. Early in his administration, President Obama 
signed a major appropriations bill—the omnibus spending bill for 
FY 2009 left over from the previous Congress and the Bush admin-
istration. Th at bill included more than 9,000 earmarks worth some 
$7.7 billion (Jones 2009). Some of these earmarks were inserted 
by members of the Obama administration when they were still in 
Congress. Transportation secretary Ray LaHood, Labor secretary 
Hilda Solis, Chief of Staff  Rahm Emanuel, and Vice President Joe 
Biden were all credited with earmarks in FY 2009 appropriations 
legislation (Jones 2009). Th e administration characterized the FY 
2009 earmarks as “the fi nishing up of last year’s appropriations legis-
lation, and drew attention to another, much larger spending bill the 
president had signed that included no earmarks, i.e., the stimulus 
package (White House 2009c).
Th e president also used the occasion of signing the omnibus 
appropriations bill for FY 2009 to announce a series of principles 
intended to further reform earmarks. Th ey include the following:
1. Earmarks must be posted on the websites of sponsoring 
members in advance.
2. Earmarks must be subject to public hearings “where mem-
bers will have to justify their expense to the taxpayer.”
3. Earmarks for for-profi t entities must “be subject to the same 
competitive bidding requirements as other federal con-
tracts.”
4. Earmarks must never be traded for political favors.
5. If the administration determines that an earmark serves no 
legitimate public purpose, it will work with Congress in an 
attempt to eliminate it (White House 2009a).
President Obama reiterated his interest in using transparency 
to curb earmarks in his 2010 State of the Union speech, urging 
Congress “to publish all earmark requests on a single website before 
there’s a vote, so that the American people can see how their money 
is being spent.”
Th e Obama administration’s position is largely congruent with 
the reforms adopted by Congress, either by rule or by committee 
initiative. Its ability to enhance the eff ectiveness of these reforms, 
however, is quite limited, residing largely in its willingness to subject 
earmarks to the kind of review contemplated by Executive Order 
13457 or to move aggressively to compete earmarks aimed at for-
profi t entities. Such internal reviews and competition initiatives may 
be occurring, but they are not a matter of public record. Absent 
such eff orts and information about them, ear-
mark reform will continue to be dominated 
by congressional developments.
Summary and Assessment
Following a quarter century of signifi cant 
growth, spending for earmarks peaked in FY 
2006. Th e singular FY 2007 earmark mora-
torium had a noticeable impact on earmark 
spending. Since then, and roughly coinciding 
with the reforms instituted for FY 2008–10, 
Figure 4. Average Annual Rates of Growth Before and After 
Earmark Reform
Pre-reform Post-reform
(FY 1991-2006) (FY 2008-10)
Number of Earmarks 154% -7.1%




Source: FY 2007 is used as the dividing line between pre and post reform and is 
omitted because that was the year of the fi rst and only earmark moratorium and 
because substantive reforms fi rst became effective in Fy 2008. CAGW data were 
used for the number and dollar value of earmarks while discretionary spending 
data were taken form OMB’s Historical Tables, 2010.
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members of the HAC, SAC, and the congressional leadership, none 
of whom need bribes to move these bills. Do earmarks scar Con-
gress and the budget process? Of course. But this depends in part 
on public expectations of Congress, and the values assigned to the 
disturbing shifts of the tectonic plates of entitlements, defi cits, and 
debt, compared to provisions for swine odor and manure manage-
ment research and the Harlem United wind power project. Th e 
former aff ect the U.S. economy and shape global power, determin-
ing economic and national security for U.S. citizens; the latter drive 
political careers, press releases, tweets, blogs, and news cycles.
Over time, lawmakers may anticipate more direct and informed 
questions from the media and opponents regarding the value of 
earmarks for their districts and states, compared to their value as 
direct or indirect sources of campaign contributions. Th e public 
value of earmarks may have to be more demonstrable, which, in 
turn, may alter their quality and quantity. Th at said, the FY 2010 
defense appropriations bill passed by the House suggests that the 
nexus involving HAC members, lobbyists, earmarks, and campaign 
contributions has not disappeared. In the fall of 2009, almost half 
of the members of the HAC Defense Subcommittee were pictured 
in the Washington Post under the headline “Under Scrutiny” as part 
of a story on investigations by the House Ethics Committee and the 
Offi  ce of Congressional Ethics involving earmarks and the PMA 
Group in the fall of 2009 (Leonnig 2009).
Th e earmark reform era is well underway. Shafts of light now illu-
minate these small but previously shadowed pockets of discretionary 
spending, itself a declining category of the federal budget. What is 
commonly suspected about the contents of these nooks and cran-
nies and how they get there is revealed: select legislators use their 
power over appropriations to send small sums to favored entities 
for specifi c purposes, some of which are questionable from a public 
policy perspective. Th is frequently results in campaign contributions 
to these legislators, a legal, if ethically questionable, transaction that 
is also now quite visible. Th e earmarks themselves have minimal 
and diminishing impact on the defi cit. Much still depends on the 
duration and enforcement of earmark reforms, and the culture of 
Congress.
Notes
1. In 2007, the director of the Congressional Research Service indicated that it 
had relinquished this eff ort “due to the recent changes made in legislation that 
establishes legislative standards for earmark reporting” (Mulhollan 2007). Th e 
agency resumed reporting on earmarks in 2009.
2. James Savage (1991), attributing the term “saints” to David Mayhew, used it to 
draw attention to the role played by prominent and persistent critics of pork-
barrel spending.
3. In 2007, Chairman Obey introduced a motion on the fl oor of the House to 
eliminate all earmarks; it failed, 53–369, with a majority in both parties voting 
against it (HAC 2008).
4. No earmark information of this kind can be found on the website of the Library 
of Congress.
5. Some HAC subcommittees may have held “member request” hearings to allow 
members to justify their earmark requests. If so, this would be without precedent 
(Krawzak 2009).
6. For example, http://appropriations.house.gov/pdf/2010_DE_Certs.pdf, the link 
to the certifi cation letters for the FY 2010 defense appropriations bill, provides 
access to a document that runs to 1,443 pages (accessed March 1, 2010).
the committee reform process remains diffi  cult, given the opacity 
of earmark policy making and enforcement within the committee. 
Th e impact of HAC reforms is diminished when the SAC does not 
follow the same course, as is common.
As the sums involved in earmarking become increasingly marginal 
to fi scal policy, competition for them continues to be dominated by 
a small subset within Congress. Th e governing role of the members 
of the HAC and SAC in the distribution of earmarks is unlikely 
to attenuate under the reforms, as the advantages that earmarks 
off er them persist. Th e distribution of earmarks in post-reform 
spending cycles reinforces this notion, particularly with regard to 
the defense subcommittees. Well before the implementation of 
the reforms addressed here, Schick noted that “earmarks survive 
periodic reform campaigns because the chief political value of serv-
ing on  Appropriations is to bring home the bacon, not to guard the 
 Treasury” (2000, 215).
Following the March 2010 announcement of the HAC ban on for-
profi t earmarks and the House Republican Conference ban on all 
earmarks for its members, public interest groups remained predict-
ably unsatisfi ed. Th e lobby arm of CAGW sent an e-mail requesting 
contributions and warning against complacency: “Th ese earmark 
reform measures are full of loopholes and workarounds” (Council 
for CAGW 2010). CAGW argues that the only good earmark is no 
earmark. TCS took an apparently more pragmatic position, endors-
ing the two bans as a means to the end of earmark reform. Th at end, 
according to TCS, is “merit-based, competitive or formula systems for 
awarding project funding” (2010a). Th is, however, is the antithesis 
of the logic of earmarking, which is to allow individual members of 
Congress to exercise that institution’s power of the purse, in lieu of 
other criteria.
Th us, these two organizations, so critical to tracking and publicizing 
earmarks, would terminate them, either literally or functionally. But 
earmarks will not be abolished. What matters now are the particu-
lars of each appropriations bill, including earmarks, all of which will 
be available on the web, and what the media and the public make 
of them. Th e synergy of governmental and public interest databases 
is essential to this enterprise. Th e media can report as members of 
Congress earmark wisely, or otherwise, and the electoral chips will 
fall as they may and as they should.
Earmarks refl ect two forms of waste: one negligible, the other nota-
ble because it defl ects attention from more serious budget matters. 
As noted here, earmark spending is stable and smaller than ever as a 
share of discretionary and total spending. It is what former Sena-
tor Alan Simpson referred to as “a sparrow’s belch in the midst of a 
typhoon” (Calmes 2010). Some earmarks will always fail the smell 
test, and will be more easily spotted and quickly reported than ever. 
Earmarks are wasteful insofar as the time and attention they receive 
within the congressional budget process and the associated media 
cycle might be better spent—for example, in understanding the 
implications of complexity in the tax code. Earmarks now represent 
much ado about very little, except insofar as individual members 
cross ethical or legal lines.
Are earmarks the grease still needed to move the appropriations 
wheel? At the margin, perhaps. Earmarks go predominantly to 
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